The defences available to an agent accused of wrongdoing can be considered as justifications (which render acts lawful) or excuses (which shield the agent from the legal consequences of the wrongful act). This distinction is familiar to many domestic legal systems, and tracks analogous notions in moral philosophy and ordinary language. Nevertheless, it remains contested in some domestic jurisdictions where it is often argued that the distinction is purely theoretical and has no consequences in practice. In international law too the distinction has been fraught with controversy, though there are increasing calls for its recognition. This book is the first to comprehensively and thoroughly examine the distinction and its relevance to the international legal order. Combining an analysis of state practice, and historical, doctrinal and theoretical developments, the book shows that the distinction is not only possible in international law but that it is also one that would have important practical implications.

The defences available to an agent accused of wrongdoing can be considered as justifications (which render acts lawful) or excuses (which shield the agent from the legal consequences of the wrongful act). This distinction is familiar to many domestic legal systems, and tracks analogous notions in moral philosophy and ordinary language. Nevertheless, it remains contested in some domestic jurisdictions where it is often argued that the distinction is purely theoretical and has no consequences in practice. In international law too the distinction has been fraught with controversy, though there are increasing calls for its recognition. This book is the first to comprehensively and thoroughly examine the distinction and its relevance to the international legal order. Combining an analysis of state practice, and historical, doctrinal and theoretical developments, the book shows that the distinction is not only possible in international law but that it is also one that would have important practical implications.

Many international obligations are subject to exceptions. These can be expressed in several ways: an obligation may be vitiated by the presence of one of its constitutive negative requirements, an obligation may be set aside by the application of another more specific rule, or an actor might have a right to act in a certain way notwithstanding a contrary obligation. Exceptions are also of fundamental practical importance: for example, they affect the allocation of the burden of proof. This volume provides a systematic and analytic study of exceptions to legal obligations in international law and defences for breaches of these obligations. It features contributions written by legal philosophers, who introduce various theoretical approaches to the role of exceptions, and scholars of international law, who elaborate on generic issues applicable to exceptions in international law as well as examine specific issues arising from exceptions in their respective areas of expertise. Topics covered include the use of force, international criminal law, human rights, trade, investment, environment, and jurisdictional immunities.